in the West Hemisphere:
The Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict
There are serious implications of the global environment on the future of the Inter-American system. A system that has a history of loose cooperation may find itself more or less adept at dealing with the complex future of global relations. Certainly, traditional questions of poverty, domestic government stability, border skirmishes and others will have to be tackled alongside newer concerns like migration, narcotics trafficking, and the environment.In analyzing the efforts at peacekeeping and conflict resolution in the case of Ecuador and Peru this article asks, "Is the Inter-American System able to synthesize the various actors and processes to bring about effective governance in the new global system?" This article begins with a historical summary of the border dispute. Then it reviews the changing nature of peacekeeping efforts. Finally, it looks at the eventual agreement settling the conflict and reflecting the new environment of global relations.
Subsequent to this, the Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries of Rio de Janeiro (Rio Protocol) multilaterally addressed the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru for the first time in 1942.3 A boundary commission tasked to map out the Rio agreement was able to "reach a definitive demarcation of over 95% of the border without incident" (Palmer, 1997). However, aerial mapping by the United States completed later revealed that there was an uncharted river (the Cenepa River) and a mountain spur that brought into question a part of the Rio Protocol's boundary. This discrepancy brought to light in 1947, produced tension between Ecuador and Peru because the Protocol's boundary was based on the supposed watershed in the region. Peru has since argued that the original Rio Protocol is legally binding. Ecuador's position legally takes issue with the Protocol because part of the 1942 agreement can not be executed.4 Most fighting has occurred over this central section of the border, about 78 kilometers in length (see Map 2).5
Hostilities occurred for a time in 1981, again in Peru's favor, and were mediated by the OAS. In the mid-1990s Peru was forced to redeploy much of its military away from the border region in order to suppress the Shining Path guerilla movement. Ecuador took advantage of the opportunity by establishing and garrisoning outposts along defensible terrain in the disputed area protected by artillery and thousands of minefields. Fighting broke out in 1995 and at its height, about 3000 Ecuadorian and 2000 Peruvian troops were deployed in the region. Additionally, Ecuador "marshaled tanks and artillery along the western coastal border, where no fighting took place" (Marcella, 1995) near another contentious area involving a canal (see Map 3).6 The hostilities were, for the first time, decidedly in favor of Ecuador's forces that had the advantages of terrain, shorter lines of communication, and new technologies. Reports indicate as many as nine Peruvian aircraft were shot down on the border and casualties were higher for Peru as well.
Invoked by both Peru and Ecuador, the four guarantor countries of the Rio Protocol (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States) worked to eventually bring about a cease fire in the Itamaraty Peace Declaration signed in Brasilia on 17 February 1995. Continued fighting delayed, for a short time, the imposition of the Ecuador-Peru Military Observer Mission (MOMEP) which began its duties by the end of February.
MOMEP's first task was to separate the combatants, which took about a month. Over the next three months, a rectangular demilitarized zone of about 528 square kilometers was established (Marcella, 1995). MOMEP's mission was to secure peace between the two combatants while diplomatic efforts sought to bring an end to the conflict. MOMEP consisted of an equal number of observers from all four guarantor countries and was led by a Brazilian general.7 The group was headquartered in Ecuador but manned two posts, one in Ecuador and one in Peru with observers rotated to the two posts by air due to the large number of unrecorded minefields in the area. The US component was largely made up of aviation assets used for transportation and for aerial reconnaissance of the demilitarized zone - "Joint Task Force Safe Border". Eventually, Ecuador and Peru replaced observers from the guarantor countries as diplomatic efforts met with success.
Noteworthy aspects to MOMEP's organization and mission besides the fact that it subordinated US troops to another West Hemisphere authority is that its operational funding was provided by Ecuador and Peru. As Madeleine Albright remarked, "What was truly unique about this observer mission was that its expenses were paid for by the two antagonists, who realized it was cheaper to pay the price of peace than the costs of war".8 Further, it marked another instance in which the countries of Latin America are becoming engaged beyond their immediate borders. Other peacekeeping efforts in the hemisphere include Brazil under the OAS in Suriname and under the UN in El Salvador; OAS demining efforts in Nicaragua by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay; and the participation of a number of hemispheric states in Haiti9 to name a few. Additionally outside the West Hemisphere, Argentina participates or has participated in peacekeeping in the Persian Gulf, Croatia, Cyprus and Mozambique; Brazil in Angola, Rwanda-Uganda and Mozambique; Chile in Kuwait, Cambodia and Kashmir; and Uruguay in the Sinai, Cambodia, the Persian Gulf and Mozambique. It is evident that a fundamental shift about whether to involve a state's forces "out of area" is taking place even among medium and smaller powers.
The agreement includes demarcation of the border according to the Rio Protocol as Peru argued it should. It also includes measures guaranteeing navigation on tributaries leading to the Amazon, a condition central to Ecuador's acceptance. President Mahuad and Fujimori pledged at a recent OAS meeting to reduce defense spending and to reduce arsenals currently on hand.12 Further, Ecuador pledged to reduce compulsory military service and to redeploy a quarter of its forces to crime-fighting.
Pledges by guarantor nations individually and through the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) approached nearly $3 billion, for projects designed to increase economic integration of the border region. Institutional machinery to oversee these measures includes the creation of a Binational Fund for Peace and Development steered by an advisory group.13 The funds are to come in the form of grants, concessional credits, and private investment. Other organizations expected to participate, according the IDB, include the IMF, World Bank, OAS, the Pan American Health Organization, the UN Development Programme and the Andean Development Corporation.
However one of the most startling unique aspects of the agreement included the provision that a 247 acre hill (Tihuinsa) the supposed sight of a heroic Ecuadorian defense is to be "granted to Ecuador as private property, while still remaining part of Peru".14 As President Mahuad noted in his speech, The solution proposed by the guarantors was extremely creative. They managed to divide juridical concepts that normally go together and that would seem to be indivisible. The concepts of sovereignty and property. They found they could be distinct. The proposal, which cannot be appealed, is that Tihuinsa remain under Peruvian sovereignty while belonging to Ecuador.
Madeleine Albright notes that the "tools of public diplomacy" were also instrumental to the agreement including "academics, journalists, clergy, activists and ordinary citizens."15 Groups like Conservation International were critical in their assessments of the ecological impact of conflict and national policies in the region.16 Further, local and regional indigenous groups condemned both sides and sought participation in the conflict's solution. Groups like the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and Coordination of the Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA) worked with North American organizations like the South and Meso American Indian Rights Center (SAIIC) to achieve a voice in the process.17 This goes some way towards explaining the provision to create two demilitarized parks where some of the fiercest fighting took place in order to "preserve the unique biodiversity of that remote jungle region".18